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Introduction
In December 1999, President Clinton directed the Quality
Interagency Coordination (QuIC) Task Force to explore and reduce
medical errors within the nation's health care delivery systems. The
QuIC Task Force was initiated one week following release of the initial
Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, "To Err is Human: Building a Safe
Health System." The IOM report on medical errors estimated that up
to 98,000 Americans die each year due to preventable medical mistakes
and cited the associated costs (loss of life, income, disability, and direct
health care costs) as high as $29 billion annually.1
The IOM recommended that medical mistakes be reduced by 50%
within five years. Toward that end, the IOM report advanced four
primary approaches it believed could precipitate this safer patient
environment: (a) establish a national focus to create leadership, research,
tools and protocols to enhance the knowledge base about safety; (b)
identify and learn from medical mistakes through both mandatory and
voluntary reporting systems; (c) raise standards and expectations for
improvements in safety through the actions of oversight organizations,
groups, purchasers and professional groups; and (d) implement safe
practices at the delivery level. 2
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1 Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force (QuIC), Doing What Counts for Patient
Safety- Federal Actions to Reduce Medical Errors and their Impact (Report to the President)
(March 2000), available at http://wvw.quic.gov/report/mederr2.htm.
2 Id.
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The QuIC Task Force's goal has been to implement a coordinated
effort for fulfilling these IOM recommendations with action items and
to work toward improving overall quality of care. This goal seeks to
increase public awareness, improve standards and develop an
infrastructure to study and reduce medical mistakes.
William Richardson, CEO of the W.K. Kellogg Foundation,
chaired the committee that wrote the initial IOM report. When the
report was released, Richardson stated, "It may be part of human
nature to err, but it is also part of human nature to create solutions, find
better alternatives, and meet the challenges ahead."' 3 Further
commenting on the report, Richardson said he believes in the health
care system's ability to respond to the challenges ahead with benefit of
good leadership, resources, and knowledge.
This imperative to understand and then reduce medical mistakes
was likewise reinforced by President Clinton in a December 7, 1999
White House press release. 4 The President noted: "Once you know
about a problem, you're under a moral obligation to deal with it, ...
whatever the consequences are, we have to go forward." 5 Even though
admitting a mistake may cause psychological angst for the provider,
disclosing the mistake to a patient and his family is the right thing to
do, according to Wu and McPhee. 6 The current study focuses on the
IOM and QuIC recommendations to enhance the knowledge base
about patient safety and increase leadership awareness.
The topic of medical mistakes has received much attention since the
release of the initial IOM report. An important aspect of the patient
safety initiative is the disclosure of medical mistakes to patients and
their families. Risk management professionals comprise an integral part
of the health care team that must carry out disclosure policy
management following a known medical mistake. Knowledge
regarding risk management professionals' beliefs about disclosure of
3 Press Release, Institute of Medicine, Medical Errors Cited in Institute of Medicine Report
(Nov. 29, 1999), available at http:l/pharmacology.about.com/library/99news/bl9n1 129a.htm.
4 Press Release, The White House Press Office, Medical Errors Remarks by President
Clinton (Dec. 7, 1999), available at http:/lpharmacology.about.com/library/99news/
b19n1207a.htm.
5 Id.
6 Catherine Keyes & Tom A. Angello, Teaching Residents and Medical Students to
Disclose Mistakes, 18 Forum: Risk Management Foundation of the Harvard Medical
Institutions 6 (April 1997) (interviewing Albert Wu & Stephan McPhee).
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mistakes offers important insights for benchmarking purposes. It also
clarifies the role risk managers play in their organizations' decisions
about disclosure management. Uncovering what risk managers believe
about their organizations' attitudes toward disclosure will also help
them understand how attuned they are with organizational leadership's
attitudes.
The purpose of this survey research was to identify risk managers'
recommended actions for disclosure of known medical mistakes along
with their rationale(s) for disclosure management. Additionally, the
study was designed to identify organizational leadership's attitudes
toward disclosure as perceived by the risk management respondents
using a valid and reliable survey.
The process of disclosing medical mistakes requires a team
approach and should include physician providers, risk management,
organizational leadership, patients and their families. Previous research
on medical mistakes and disclosure has examined each of these team
member groups. Literature related to disclosure from the vantage point
of physicians, risk management, leadership, and the patients provided
the foundation for the current study and research design.
Literature Review
In a study by Hingorani, Wong and Vafidis, attitudes toward
disclosure of information after an adverse event were compared
between doctors (n = 48) and patients (n = 246) from a single British
hospital surgical clinic. 7 Survey data were used to answer whether a
patient should be told of a known adverse event, and to what degree
information should be offered. Most patients (89%) believed that full
disclosure of an adverse event should be provided along with an
explanation of possible future complications. On the other hand, only
33% of the physicians believed in a full disclosure with discussion about
possible future complications.
Witman and Hardin researched patients' responses to physicians'
mistakes through a mail survey in an outpatient clinic. 8 Three
7 Melanie Hingorani, Tina Wong & Gilli Vafidis, Attitudes after Unintended Injury
During Treatment: A Survey of Doctors and Patients, 171 W.J. Med. 81 (1999).
8 Amy B. Witman & Steven Hardin, Patient's Responses to Physician's Mistakes, 18
Forum: Risk Management Foundation of the Harvard Medical Institutions 4 (April 1997).
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scenarios of mistakes, which had been rated as minor, moderate, or
severe, were presented to the patients. Patients were asked several
questions about the type of information that would be desired
following a known medical mistake. Patients were also asked to
respond to several questions about their perceptions of care within two
conditions: (a) when a mistake has been disclosed and (b) when not
informed of a mistake but incidentally discovered by the patient. The
risk that a patient would file a lawsuit when informed about a mistake,
compared to not informed, rose from 12% to 20% in the moderate
scenario, and rose again from 60% to 76% in the severe scenario. Many
malpractice suits are brought, not solely because of clinical
misadventure, but because of anger related to some aspect of the
patient-doctor relationship or communication. 9 Patients were less
likely to sue a physician or health care organization if they liked the
care-givers and had a good relationship with them before the mistake
occurred 10 and good communication took place following the event.
The physicians' hesitancy to disclose known medical mistakes may
be due to reluctance to share bad news about mistakes. Fear of
threatening a patient's trust in physicians and potential litigation were
also cited as primary influences on the physician respondents' answers in
the Hingorani, Wong and Vafidis study.1 1 Other influencing factors
included concern for patient anxiety and reluctance within the medical
culture to admit mistakes and accept accountability. Historically, the
foundation of the physicians' ethical responsibility to the patient is to
"do no harm." Acceptance of this mandate will require that the
physician abide by the oath with honesty and integrity. Physicians are
nonetheless challenged to balance professional and personal concerns
regarding disclosure, and many are frankly reluctant to participate in
such activities as root cause analysis or openly discuss mistakes 12 for
fear of increased liability risk.
9 Bernard B. Virshup, Andrew A. Oppenberg & Marlene M. Coleman, Strategic Risk
Management: Reducing Malpractice Claims through More Effective Patient-Doctor
Communication, 14(4) Am. J. Med. Quality 153 (1999).
10 Henry T. Greely, Do Physicians Have a Duty to Disclose?, 171 W.J. Med. 82 (1999).
11 Hingorani, Wong & Vafadis, supra note 7.
12 Shelly M. Pierce, Analysis of Physician Participation in JCAHO's Sentinel Event Root
Cause Analysis (1999) (unpublished Master's thesis, Finch University of Health Sciences/The
Chicago Medical School).
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The medical culture itself has been implicated as a potential barrier
to truth telling and openness about disclosing mistakes. The medical
community tends to treat mistakes as deviant and to scapegoat
"culprits." 13 Fear of disciplinary actions or threats to licensure may
override the decision to disclose a mistake. It has been suggested that
physician mentors help their peers cultivate the necessary skills and
ethical reasoning on how to appropriately disclose mistakes. Lacking an
ethical model and formalized communication training, organized
medicine's disclosure procedures often vary and inadvertently may
increase liability risk exposures.
Researchers reporting on earlier studies have estimated that
approximately 4% of hospital admissions result in iatrogenic injury and
25% of these injuries could be attributed to negligence.14 Wu's article
estimated that although less than 20% of medical malpractice cases
involve negligence, almost all involved physician-patient
communication breakdown allegations. His argument is that open
disclosure is the best defense and may avert patients' seeking legal
action by as much as 50% - if done properly.
O'Connell and Keller propose that risk managers' attitudes toward
disclosure of medical mistakes may influence their counseling of
physicians. 15 The authors identified risk managers' concerns that
clinicians who disclose mistakes may do so in a manner that could be
considered self-blaming, accusatory, or defensive. Part of the risk
management function is to help practitioners cultivate communication
skills, constructive behaviors, and attitudes toward disclosure of known
medical mistakes without encouraging a punitive or retaliatory
response.
Health care risk management professionals are challenged to
implement proactive methods that will assist their respective
organizations' effective response to patient safety issues. Likewise, risk
managers assume an integral role in positioning their organizations with
the IOM's recommendations for establishing a safer patient
13 Keyes & Angello, supra note 6.
14 Albert W. Wu, Handling Hospital Errors: Is Disclosure the Best Defense?, 131 Annals
Internal Med. 970 (1999).
15 Daniel O'Connell & Vaughn F. Keller, Communication: A Risk Management Tool, 6(1)
J. Clin. Outcomes Mgmt. 35 (1999).
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environment. Risk managers also bear an ethical responsibility for
reducing the liability exposures of their organizations, which requires a
balanced rationale for disclosure management.
The perceptions that risk management professionals hold regarding
disclosure are believed to influence other decision-makers, providers
and organizational leadership alike, as to what recommendations would
most likely be proposed. Risk managements' attitudes toward the
importance of medical mistake disclosure may also influence other
colleagues throughout an organization. In general, the risk manager as a
member of the health care team has the capacity for sharing knowledge
with leadership and to provide guidance on truth telling and disclosure
management.
Truth telling and apologizing to patients following medical
mistakes have been described as healing for both patients and
physicians. 16 However, there seem to be gradients of truth telling as
physicians balance their professional and ethical obligations against their
personal values, emotional conflicts, and apprehensions about spawning
litigation. Intuitively, truth telling makes good sense, but there is a vast
difference between advocating an appropriate truth-telling posture in a
hypothetical vein and actually carrying out such a discussion. 17
The doctor-patient relationship is based upon trust and honesty.
Patients expect to be informed about their health status, especially
when a mistake has been made. Physicians bear the ethical obligation to
disclose significant mistakes when that truth benefits the health of the
patient and respects the patient's autonomy, regardless of ramifications
to the physician or health care organization.1 8 Organizational
leadership and physicians alike need to support a consistent disclosure
policy and openly accept responsibility for cooperative and appropriate
16 Chantal Brazeau, Curbside Consultation: Disclosing the Truth About a Medical Error, 60
Am. Fain. Physician 1013, 1014 (1999).
17 Id
18 Albert W. Wu et al., To Tell the Truth: Ethical and Practical Issues in Disclosing Medical
Mistakes to Patients, 12 J. Gen. Internal Med. 770 (1997); Michael Nowicki & Maneesh
Chaku, Do Healthcare Managers Have an Ethical Duty to Admit Mistakes?, Healthcare Fin.
Mgmt. 62 (Oct. 1998); National Patient Safety Foundation, Talking to Patients about Health
Care Injury- Statement of Principle (Nov. 14, 2000), at http://www.npsf.orglstatement.htm;
Catherine Keyes, Responding to an Adverse Event, 18 Forum: Risk Management Foundation
of the Harvard Medical Institutions 2 (April 1997).
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disclosure management.
An example of a successful disclosure policy can be found in
Lexington, Kentucky, where the Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center
initiated its full disclosure policy in 1987 with positive results. 19 Early
intervention following a known medical mistake accompanied by
proactive investigation of injuries, full disclosure of findings to the
patient, and fair compensation have become acknowledged
cornerstones of risk management policy at this facility. The Lexington
VA risk management policy is designed to directly and expeditiously
mobilize an intervention plan with quick resolution following an injury
and serves as a model for other health care organizations across the
country.
The outcomes of such an honest approach, however, can prove
difficult to measure due to confounding factors leading up to litigation.
Malpractice payments are determined by many factors both related
and unrelated to actual medical care. Although not the best measure,
medical malpractice judgments may indicate one outcome of poor
disclosure policies. Malpractice settlements reported in the Kraman and
Hamm study revealed that the private sector's mean judgment was
$1,484,000, compared to the Veteran Affair's mean settlement at
$720,000.20 Although this statistic is significant, additional clinical,
psychosocial, and financial indicators are still needed to identify other
benefits resulting from truth telling and aggressive disclosure policies.
Practitioners, risk management, organizational leadership, and
patients must develop a learning community that will collaboratively
implement a systems approach with appropriate measurement tools to
study the latent effects of medical mistakes. 2 1 Consistent collection of
relevant data regarding medical mistake management and outcomes of
open disclosure is essential to better understand underlying
contributory factors. Such outcome evidence, together with evaluation
19 Steve S. Kraman & Ginny Hamm, Risk Management: Extreme Honesty May be the Best
Policy, 131 Annals Internal Med. 963 (1999).
20 Id.
21 David Woods, Moving Forward on Patient Safety Inquiry, Innovation and Learning, The
Ohio State University, Institute for Ergonomics (March 2000), a
http:l/vww.sahs.uth.tmc.edu/SpeakerSeries/woods2-99.html; Steve Stelovich, Framework for
Handling Adverse Events, 18 Forum: Risk Management Foundation of the Harvard Medical
Institutions 8 (April 1997).
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of the health care teams' attitudes toward full disclosure, provides
knowledge that should prove useful as health care organizations move
forward with a variety of patient safety initiatives.
Since the release of the initial IOM Report, many federal initiatives
and organizations have worked together to respond to the QuIC
agenda. The common goal for the health care industry is to improve
the quality of care throughout the delivery system by focusing on
medical mistakes and insisting on approaches to reduce their
prevalence. The QuIC's call to action specifically focuses on enactment
of the IOM recommendations. In keeping with this goal, the current
study highlights the importance of ensuring that health care leaders
actively seek more information about patient safety and use this
knowledge to streamline their organizations' efforts.
Attitudes toward disclosure and truth telling collectively perceived
by patients, physician providers and risk management have been
studied at some length. Potential legal risks, professional and personal
risks for open disclosure, and barriers to consistent management of
medical mistake's disclosure have also been addressed. Risk managers
have been identified as integral team members whose participation will
be essential if organizational leadership and physicians are to succeed in
early intervention following a known medical mistake, with open
disclosure at the right time, with the right team, using the right
information. This body of literature related to medical mistake
disclosure deals with patients' perceptions and experiences,
practitioners' concerns over disclosure, and reports that portray the
magnitude of mistakes as well as the challenges to disclosure. The
literature reveals little about the risk management profession's
perceptions about either the extent to which disclosure of a medical
mistake should be made to patients and families, or the rationale for
recommending a particular action. Additionally, nothing could be
found in the literature that discusses the degree to which risk managers
are in synchrony with their respective organizations' attitudes about
medical mistake disclosure. This study was designed to begin to fill
these gaps in the literature.
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Importance of the Study
Several points can be made about the importance of this study.
Benchmark measurements will be strongly influenced by risk managers'
perceptions about appropriate disclosure policies and procedures. The
knowledge gain about disclosure attitudes is important to
organizational leadership, especially if clinical providers/leaders foster
collaboration with risk management. Synergy between risk
management and organizational leadership on a consistent disclosure
policy represents commitment to the institution's obligation to provide
a safe patient environment and supports the IOM's recommendations.
Such risk management collaboration is essential to fulfillment of
respective organizational missions, goals, and objectives. Organizational
leadership acceptance of risk management recommendations toward
disclosure may be important for synchronizing an effective team.
Without salient policies such teams may have difficulty responding
appropriately (and with conviction) to mistakes. It is, therefore,
important to gain knowledge regarding the strength of the relationship
between risk management and leadership philosophy about disclosure
of medical mistakes.
Future important dialogue and proactive initiatives can result when
risk managers in cooperation with their leadership develop
organizational guidelines for disclosure. It is essential for the risk
management community to support an open forum seeking the
participation of vested parties, including administrators, physicians and
other providers, insurers, partnering affiliates, and most of all the
patients regarding disclosure management. This research should help
provide direction for potential indicators, which result from an
organization's open disclosure posture, or the lack thereof. Outcomes of
this research will hopefully promote a foundation for future studies
among additional populations, utilizing a variety of data and
measurements.
Limitations of the Study
Several limitations may have affected the current study about risk
managements' attitudes toward disclosure. The study data were
collected by a self-reported survey, which was mailed to health care risk
management professionals without benefit of external accuracy
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validation. The study lacked measurement of actual risk management
practices (criterion validity) regarding participants' roles, accountability
in disclosure of medical mistakes, or the institutional consequences
from those practices. The study population was drawn from a national
membership pool of risk management professionals and, therefore, may
not reflect the views of non-membership risk management or non-
respondents. The study was also limited to risk management
professionals' attitudes and recommendations about disclosure of
medical mistakes. The views of other important comparative groups,
such as patients, health care providers, purchasers of services, or the
general public, were not included.
Research Methods
Subjects
The subjects were health care risk managers who, at the time of the
study were members of an international professional association. The
cross-sectional study sample (N = 3430) was primarily domestic but
included a small international segment. This convenience sample
included a diverse group from various educational backgrounds, work
experiences, work settings, current responsibilities, and types of
industries, who were involved with the health care risk management
function in some capacity.
Data Collection Survey
The self-reported survey consisted of five hypothetical scenarios of
patient encounters each of which involved some type of medical
mistake. Although fictitious, the scenarios were derived from a
composite of actual medical malpractice claims which the research team
reconstructed for purposes of the study. The outcomes of the scenarios
varied from no harm to death: (a) a surgical mishap resulting in death;
(b) an unneeded mastectomy due to an erroneous lymph node
diagnosis; (c) two medication overdoses; and (d) a child who wandered
away from a pediatric unit. A research team of health care risk
management professionals developed the survey.2 2.
22 The research team included: the author; Grena Porto, R.N., M.S., A.R.M., Director of
Clinical Risk Management, VHA Inc.; Geri Amori, Ph.D., A.R.M., F.A.S.H.R.M., Risk
Manager, Fletcher Allen Health Care; Christopher Cassirer, Sc.D., M.P.H., Vernon E.
Weckwerth Professor of Health Care Executive Studies, Department of Health Care
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Four identical questions were presented following each scenario. A
five-point ordinal scale followed each question that subjects used to
indicate respective level of agreement. Each subject was asked to
respond from his or her own perspective and then from his or her
leadership's anticipated perspective. Table 1 below presents the first
scenario with the four respective questions and response options.
Table 1
Scenario One - Lacerated Pulmonary Artery
A 70-year-old man with a long history of tuberculosis is admitted for surgery to resect the
remaining portion of his right lung. He and his family members have been informed that due
to the scarring both from prior surgery and the disease itself, the surgery will be complicated
and carries additional risk. During the surgery, the surgeon's hand slips and inadvertently
lacerates the pulmonary artery. Despite all attempts to control the bleeding, the patient suffers
cardiopulmonary arrest in the operating room. Resuscitation fails and the patient dies.
(a) Which of the following statements best (b) Which of the following statements best
describes what you believe the patient's describes why you chose this option?
family should be told about what happened?
(c) Which of the following statements best (d) Which of the following statements best
describes what you believe your organization describes why you believe your organization
would tell the patient's family about would choose this option?
what happened?
1. That the patient died from complications 1. Health care providers do not have
of his disease, to disclose medical mistakes.
2. That the patient died from complications 2. Health care providers do not have to
of the surgery. disclose medical mistakes if disclosure
3. That there was an unexpected complication will increase the risk of liability to the
during surgery and it is uncertain whether this provider.
contributed to the patient's death. 3. Health care providers do not have to
4. That there was an unexpected complication disclose medical mistakes if is unlikely
during surgery and this contributed to the that the patient or family would ever
patient's death, find out about the mistake.
5. That the pulmonary artery was accidentally 46 Health care providers have to disclose
lacerated and this caused a hemorrhage, medical mistakes only if it is certain that
resulting in the patient's death, the mistake caused the injury or
changed the ultimate prognosis or
outcome of treatment.
5. Health care providers have to disclose
medical mistakes whether or not there
was an injury, even if it will increase the
risk of liability to the provider.
Management, University of Minnesota; Nancy Wilson, M.D., M.P.H., Vice President, VHA
Inc.; Martin J. Hatlie, Esq., President, Partnership for Patient Safety.
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Several multiple-choice demographic questions were included at the
end of the survey. Additionally, one open-ended question was
presented. The question asked, "What do you believe is the biggest
barrier to disclosure of medical mistakes in your organization?" Open
space was provided for additional comments the respondent might
wish to offer.
In March 2000, a postcard was mailed to each risk management
subject introducing the forthcoming survey and identifying the six-
member research team. In April, the Attitudes of Risk Management
Professionals Toward Disclosure of Medical Mistakes Survey was
mailed, along with an introductory letter signed by the research team.
A stamped, self-addressed return envelope was included. Two weeks
after the survey mailing, a reminder postcard was mailed to the national
risk management mailing list. Upon receipt of the completed surveys,
raw data were entered into SPSS statistical software for subsequent
descriptive and inferential procedures.
Data Analysis
A descriptive analysis was performed on the collective set of 20
questions. Frequency distributions were generated for each of the
demographic variables including: (a) current employers; (b) setting of
the employers' organization; and (c) the title of the risk
manager/respondent's supervisor.
The chi-square one-way test was used to evaluate whether observed
frequencies for a single qualitative variable were adequately described
by hypothesized or expected frequencies. 2 3 If the agreement between
the observed and expected frequencies were similar for each category,
the chi-square would be small indicating proportions are uniform across
all categories. However, if the divergence between observed and
expected frequencies were large, the chi-square would also be large and
rise to the level of significance indicating that responses considerably
vary across the categories. The critical alpha level of .0001 was chosen
for this study given the number of iterative chi-square procedures used
23 Robert S. Witte & John S. Witte, Statistics (5th ed. 1997); Sidney Siegel & John N.
Castellan, Jr., Nonpararnetric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (2d ed. 1988).
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as a control against Type I error. A chi-square test was applied to each
of the 20 study questions included in the survey (four questions across
five scenarios).
Gamma correlations were generated between: (a) respondents'
beliefs about information to be disclosed; and (b) risk managers'
assumptions about their respective organizations' recommendations for
each of the five scenarios. Additionally, gamma correlations were
generated between: (a) reasons why medical mistakes should be
disclosed as indicated by respondents' choices; and (b) reasons why
their organization was anticipated to recommend its choice across each
scenario. The gamma correlation is a measurement of the strength of
relationship between two ordinal variables. The gamma measurements
were considered indicative of the degree to which risk managers were in
synchrony with their organization's attitude toward medical mistake
disclosure and why. Gamma correlations range from zero to 1.0 where
a large value indicates significant agreement. The critical alpha level
.0001 was utilized for all gamma procedures.
Several assumptions were made about the study. It was assumed
that: (a) the survey items were measurable and indicative of typical
medical mistake disclosure options; (b) all information as reported by
respondents was believed to accurately reflect individuals' perceptions
about the content and rationale behind disclosures of mistakes; (c) the
participants' responses were considered representative of the health care
risk management population; (d) the measurement scale was at the
ordinal level; (e) the survey was considered valid and reliable for the
current research; and (f) the chi-square goodness-of-fit tests and
gamma correlations were appropriate statistical procedures to test the
hypotheses advanced.
Two hypotheses were advanced: (a) the chi-squares and proportion
of responses across the five options provided for each question were
expected to significantly vary across the choices and (b) the gamma
correlations between risk managements' responses and the anticipated
responses of their organizations would be significantly related across the
five scenarios.
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Results
Participants
Of the 3,430 surveys mailed, 41 envelopes were returned as
undeliverable; therefore, 3,389 surveys were delivered. Forty-seven
surveys were incomplete and subsequently removed from the analysis.
A total of 603 usable surveys were returned for statistical analysis,
yielding an overall 19% return rate.
Descriptive Statistics
The study participants worked for thirteen different types of
employer groups. The top three categories were acute care (n = 335),
insurance companies (n = 74), and academic medical centers (n = 51).
The geographical settings where respondents lived were urban (n =
305), suburban (n = 177) and rural (n = 113), with the remaining
eight respondents un-declared.
Table 2
Frequency Distribution of Respondents' Demographics
Reporting Relationship Setting Employer
Title Frequency Percent Type Frequency Percent Type Frequency Percent
Pres./CEO 126 20.9 Urban 305 50.6 Acute 335 55.6
COO 46 7.6 Suburban 177 29.4 Academic 51 8.5
CFO 29 4.8 Rural 113 18.7 Military 13 2.2
Legal 63 10.4 Missing 8 1.3 MCO 9 1.5
CMO 43 7.1 Rehab. 7 1.2
Quality 59 9.8 Ambul 6 1.0
Risk Mgt. 118 19.6 Phys.Off. 15 2.5
Other 108 17.9 Insurer 74 12.3
Missing 11 1.8 Consult 19 3.2





Total N=603 100 % N=603 100 % N=603 100 %
Occasionally, respondents would indicate both urban and other
categories, in which case the individual was coded as urban.
Reporting relationships indicated that the respondents varied across
eight categories. The top three categories reported to the
President/CEO (n = 127), Vice President or Director of Risk
Management (n = 118), and other (n = 107), which demonstrated
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very diverse reporting relationships. Frequency distributions for types of
employer groups, geographical settings, and reporting relationships are
provided in Table 2.
Frequency distributions of participant responses to the five
scenarios' sets of questions are provided in Tables 3-7. The first
scenario's details and options, presented in Table 1, relate to a patient
with tuberculosis who underwent a lung resection. During surgery, the
pulmonary artery was inadvertently lacerated and the patient died
despite resuscitation efforts. Table 3 provides the frequency distribution
of responses to the four questions posed along with the gamma
correlations for the first scenario.
Table 3
Frequency Distribution of Responses to Lacerated Pulmonary Artery Scenario
N=603 Frequency of risk Frequency of Frequency of risk Frequency of
manager's disclosure organization's disclosure manager's rationale organization's
recommendations recommendations for choice rationale for choice
Option 1 1 18 7 21
2 22 94 2 49
3 49 93 3 37
4 165 194 228 260
5 366 204 363 236
Gamma .665 .743
From this table, it can be seen that 66% (n = 366) of risk manager
respondents recommended full disclosure of details to the family (the
highest option), compared to 34% (n=204) of the respondents who
anticipated their respective organizations would recommend such
disclosure. The gamma correlation was found to be moderate (.665) for
the level of agreement between risk managers' self-reported response
and their organizations' anticipated response choices. Responding to
questions about the rationale for disclosure, 61% (n = 363) of risk
manager respondents recommended that disclosure be made whether
or not an injury had occurred, even if there is an increased risk of
liability. On the other hand, risk management respondents anticipated
that 39% (n = 236) of their organizations would share their disclosure
rationale. The gamma correlation between the rationale for risk
managers' responses and the rationale they anticipated for their
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organizations' responses, was moderately strong (.743). However, it can
also be seen in Table 3 that some variability is evident across the
responses to each of the questions with more reservations in the risk
managers' predictions of the organizations' response choices.
The second scenario involved a woman who underwent an
unneeded mastectomy due to an erroneous pathology interpretation of
lymph nodes. The range of options about what to disclose and the
rationale for disclosure was situationally appropriate to this scenario, but
was similar to the first scenario's range of options from no disclosure to
full disclosure regardless of increased risk of liability. Table 4 provides a
frequency distribution of responses to the unneeded mastectomy
scenario.
Table 4
Frequency Distribution of Responses to Unneeded Mastectomy Scenario
N=603 Frequency of risk Frequency of Frequency of risk Frequency of
manager's disclosure organization's disclosure manager's rationale organization's
recommendations recommendations for choice rationale for choice
Option 1 4 39 6 21
2 107 138 6 41
3 120 137 3 26
4 227 195 240 285
5 145 94 348 230
Gamma Correlations .784 .800
From Table 4 it can be seen that 24% (n = 145) of risk
management respondents indicated that full disclosure of the details
should be made to the patient acknowledging that the erroneous
pathology report resulted in the mastectomy. This was compared to
16% (n = 94) of risk managers' expectations as to their respective
organizations' recommendations.
The gamma correlation for the degree of relationship between risk
managers and the anticipated responses of their organizations was
moderately strong (.784), indicating synchrony between the groups.
Regarding why disclosure should be made, 58% (n = 348) of
respondents indicated that disclosure should be made regardless of
whether an injury occurred and regardless of the potential increase for
liability risk. Risk manager respondents anticipated that 38% (n =
230) of their organizations would share their disclosure rationale for this
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situation. Here again, the gamma correlation was moderately strongly
related (.800) between the risk managers' rationale of recommended
disclosure and their organizations' anticipated recommendations. This
demonstrated more variability across response options, indicating room
for additional discussions leading to more consistent agreement.
The third scenario involved a five-year-old asthmatic patient who
wandered from the pediatric unit and eventually found his way to the
roof. He was later found crying, but otherwise unharmed. The range of
risk managers' responses about recommended disclosure to the parents
and their rationales for disclosure, along with the anticipated
organizational responses, are provided in Table 5.
Table 5
Frequency Distribution of Responses to Pediatric Patient Wandering from Unit Scenario
N=603 Frequency of risk Frequency of Frequency of risk Frequency of
manager's disclosure organization's disclosure manager's rationale organization's
recommendations recommendations for choice rationale for choice
Option 1 2 13 10 20
2 6 25 5 23
3 88 131 3 26
4 110 148 142 206
5 397 286 443 328
Gamma Correlations .808 .862
Response to this scenario indicated a greater consensus that full
disclosure of the mishap's details should be made to the parents. It was
found that 66% (n = 397) of risk managers recommended the parents
be told their child wandered away from the unit and was found crying
on the roof, but otherwise unharmed. This was compared to the
organization's anticipated response at 47% (n = 286) for full disclosure
of the details. As to the rationale for disclosure, 73% (n = 443) of risk
managers indicated that disclosure should be made, regardless of injury
or increased liability risk to providers, compared to the organizations'
54% (n = 328) anticipated support for full disclosure. Gamma
correlations were somewhat higher for this hypothetical scenario at .808
for "what should be disclosed" between the respondents' choices and
those anticipated from their organization, and .862 for "why disclosure
should be made" between the respondent and anticipated
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organizational recommendations. There seems to be more willingness
to disclose the details of this particular situation, which is less serious
than the previous two scenarios, but there is still variability evident
across the options.
The fourth scenario involved a stroke patient whose condition had
been verified by a CT scan. An anticonvulsant was administered, a
respiratory arrest ensued, and the subsequent resuscitation failed. After
the failed arrest, the nurse realized she had administered twice the
ordered medication and notified the attending physician of the
mistake. Table 6 provides the range of responses and the rationale for
the risk managers' recommendations, as well as those responses
anticipated from their organization.
Table 6
Frequency Distribution of Responses to Anticonvulsant Overdose Scenario
N=603 Frequency of risk Frequency of Frequency of risk Frequency of
manager's disclosure organization's disclosure manager's rationale organization s
recommendations recommendations for choice rationale for choice
Option 1 17 84 6 24
2 18 42 7 38
3 225 212 6 36
4 259 217 218 242
5 84 48 366 263
Gamma Correlations .708 .794
This scenario revealed the strongest hesitancy by risk managers to
recommend full disclosure and divulge to the patient's family that the
anticonvulsant overdose had probably contributed to his death. It was
found that 14% (n = 94) of risk managers recommended full
disclosure and 8% (n = 48) anticipated that their respective
organizations would likewise recommend disclosure. The most frequent
response to this situation was revelation that the anticonvulsant overdose
may have contributed to the patient's death. Perhaps this scenario's
comorbidity fostered a more conservative disclosure recommendation.
The gamma correlation was .708, indicating a moderate level of
agreement between the recommendations made by risk managers and
anticipated from their organizations. Regarding rationale for disclosure,
61% (n = 366) of risk management respondents believed disclosure
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should occur regardless of whether injury occurred and even if it
increased liability risk to providers and organizations. This was
compared to 44% (n = 263) of risk management respondents who
reported their organizations would recommend full disclosure. The
gamma correlation was moderately strong at .794, again indicating
significant perceived agreement about the rationale for disclosure.
The final scenario presented a recovering surgical patient who was
receiving Heparin. On one occasion, the woman was inadvertently
administered ten times the ordered dose and required additional
testing to monitor her clotting times. Her blood levels remained within
therapeutic ranges without apparent injury due to the overdose. Table 7
provides the ranges of disclosure risk managers recommended and the
disclosure choices they expected would be implemented by their
organizations.
Table 7
Frequency Distribution of Responses to Heparin Overdose Scenario
N=603 Frequency of risk Frequency of Frequency of risk Frequency of
manager's disclosure organization's disclosure manager's rationale organization's
recommendations recommendations for choice rationale for choice
Option 1 16 40 7 21
2 1 26 5 30
3 43 91 5 36
4 156 178 189 230
5 387 268 397 286
Gamma Correlations .760 .785
In this situation, 64% (n = 387) of risk managers' recommended
full disclosure, including telling the patient that additional testing
would ensue because she had received too much Heparin. This
compared to 44% (n = 268) of the respondents who anticipated their
organizations would recommend full disclosure. The gamma
correlation was found to be .760, indicating a moderately strong level
of agreement. As to why disclosure should be given, 66% (n = 397) of
risk managers indicated that the disclosure should be made regardless
of injury or increased liability, compared to 47% (n = 286) of the
respondents who anticipated their organization would agree with this
rationale. The gamma correlation here was .785, again indicating
significant perceived agreement about the rationale for disclosure.
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Inferential Procedures
All chi-square procedures were significant, indicating that responses
statistically varied across the range of options under each of the five
scenarios (p < .0001). This means that responses were rated more
heavily in certain options out of the five choices and indicates a
preference for disclosure management. Additionally, all gamma
correlations were statistically significant (p < .0001), indicating that
risk management-recommended responses were moderately to strongly
related with their respective organizations' anticipated
recommendations. Thus, risk management professionals believed they
were consistently in agreement with their respective organizations as to
content and rationale for disclosure to patients and/or their families.
The survey's overall Cronbach's reliability coefficient alpha was .9230.
This demonstrated the survey was highly reliable and stable for internal
consistency of item responses across the aggregate of responses.
The open-ended question presented in the survey led to many
interesting and introspective comments about perceived barriers to
disclosure of medical mistakes at the organizational level. The top three
barriers repeatedly cited in descending order of frequency were: (a) fear
of litigation, publicity, and repercussions due to disclosure; (b) lacking
communication skills or education on how to disclose information
about a mistake; and (c) physician concerns over disclosure.
Discussion
The significant findings from this research were that: (a) the survey
was valid and reliable for measuring the disclosure of medical mistakes
expressed by risk managers' self-reported practices; (b) the significant
chi-square results indicated that, overall, risk managers were much more
likely to respond at Levels Four or Five to each question posed than
lower choices. However, anticipated organizational leadership responses
were somewhat conservative and more evenly spread across the options;
(c) given the significant gamma correlations, risk managers' and
expected organizational leadership's attitudes toward medical mistake
disclosure were viewed similarly as was their rationale why disclosure
choices were made; and (d) the barriers to disclosure that respondents
reported were consistent with previous literature and research.
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The chi-square test results indicated that risk managers largely agree
with a philosophical inclination to disclose medical mistakes, but they
may not be totally comfortable with full disclosure of all the known
facts. The respondents also believe that health care providers must
disclose medical mistakes, but many qualify this by finding a disclosure
duty only if a cause and effect relationship is clear. Perhaps risk
managers are predominantly influenced by one of two decision-making
models in reporting disclosure management: an ethical/moral reasoning
model or a legal/financial model.
Not all risk management professionals are convinced that full
disclosure is necessary. Between 10% and 43% of respondents rated
"what" should be recommended at lower Levels One to Three on the
ordinal scale across the five scenarios. This means that their propensity
is not to link the outcome to the adverse event in discussions with
patient and/or family. Perhaps some risk management professionals
fear that disclosure may not be in their organization's best interest. Or,
as a minority indicated, perhaps they share a philosophical aversion to
disclosure. The largest frequency for "why" risk managers chose their
action response was that health care providers are obligated to disclose
mistakes regardless of injury outcome or liability risk (Level Five). The
next most frequent response was that disclosure should be made when
causal relationships were irrefutable (Level Four). This lends support to
the theory that respondents are predominantly influenced by one of the
two decision-making models introduced in their disclosure rationale.
Participants consistently anticipated that their organization's
responses would be lower than their own personal choices. Greater
variability was evident as well in the organizational focused items,
meaning that the choices selected were more evenly distributed, not
stacked as much in one particular section of the scale. This finding may
indicate greater hesitancy on the organization's behalf to disclose,
perhaps due to administrative or clinical underpinnings or both. There
may be less consistency in organizational leadership's attitude toward
disclosure as perceived by risk management. The relationship or
symbiosis between risk management and perceived organizational
leadership responses are nonetheless moderate to strong, as evidenced
by the gamma correlations between risk managers' recommendations
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and rationale(s) with those anticipated from their organizations.
Knowledge about attitudes toward disclosure provides a framework
within which risk managers may develop policies and procedures and
implement education/coaching throughout an organization. Given
current attitudes toward disclosure evident in this study, this
knowledge may also advance the IOM recommendations for future
research, raising standards, and safe practice implementations. The
doors are open for dialogue and collaboration on how best to motivate
and empower health care organizations to move forward in their
commitment to patient safety.
Study Implications
Several study implications are apparent. First, the current study's
findings have implications for risk management professionals to better
understand the dynamic nature of medical mistake disclosure. By
contemplating the study's results, risk managers may feel empowered
to advance the knowledge about these issues and perhaps modify
practices to consistently approach disclosure activity throughout the
profession. Second, the study findings may also have implications for
organizational leadership, given the patient safety cultural shift and
expectations of patients and the public. Collaborations among
organizational leadership, risk management, and the health care
community in general will be critical to successfully fulfill the
recommendations of the initial IOM report. Leadership commitment
will be essential to an organization's ability to "walk the talk" about
patient safety. Finally, the study may also have implications for the
general public, which has a vested interest in making health care
organizations safe environments for patients. Acknowledgment of a
significant problem such as medical mistakes, accompanied by a
genuine commitment to improvement, presents a tone for growth.
Collaboration among consumers, providers, administrators, risk
managers, and external stakeholders offers the key to comprehensive
changes.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The survey on Attitudes of Risk Management Professionals Toward
Disclosure of Medical Mistakes is valid and reliable for measuring
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perceptions toward disclosure. With minimal variance about disclosure
content and rationale, risk managers, by and large, are in agreement. A
healthy attitude is evident in the positive nature of risk management
responses to the scenarios' questions. Organizational leadership's
attitudes toward disclosure were perceived by risk management to be
less likely to fully disclose a known medical mistake. Some limitations
of the findings may be related to the study's self-reported data. The
19% response rate may limit the overall findings since non-responder
attitudes could differ from these outcomes reported. Power, however,
was calculated to be 99%, indicating that results are generalizable to the
risk management population given the sample size with a low
probability of false negative results (Type II error). Overall, risk
managers reported moderate to strong philosophical synchrony with
their organizations, but 100 % agreements were not apparent.
Given these conclusions, several recommendations can be made for
future consideration. Value may result from expansion on these survey
results by exploring other populations' attitudes toward disclosure,
including patients, physicians, organizational leadership, legal
community, insurance industry, consumer activists, and manufacturers
and vendors of health care related products and services. Anticipating
another's response as in this study is not as accurate as a direct response
from the individual - an issue that next generation research may
address.
Other research designs should be considered which would drill
down further into the particular factors that shape risk managers',
physicians', and leadership's choices made for their organizations. One
such variable for consideration may be the perception of organizational
support for full disclosure of known medical mistakes. Additional
measures, such as cultural or organizational readiness assessment for
implementing a medical error management infrastructure, may provide
measurements of success indicators.
Objective outcome indicators of disclosure should be sought to
provide criterion validity for investment into the patient safety culture
that validate the self-reported practices. Such outcome measures may
include: documenting the amount of time transpired until resolution of
an event following disclosure; financial outcomes due to levels of
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disclosure; psychosocial outcome measures of full disclosure on patients
and providers alike; and legal costs for defense following full disclosure
compared to non-disclosed situations. These measures should include
financial outcomes or consequences of disclosure, clinical outcomes,
and satisfaction or psychological outcomes related to mistake
management.
More sophisticated research modeling could also be utilized to
study medical mistakes such as multivariate data initiatives to hone in
on potential latent variables and systems issues at their root. Data
mining is one such analytical process that explores large amounts of
retrospective data in search of consistent patterns and/or systematic
relationships. This is accomplished by drilling down and generating a
predictive model of an outcome specified by the researcher. Data
mining is akin to mining for gold nuggets, sifting through large
amounts of ore (data) to explore underlying treasures of useful
knowledge. 24 Data mining methodology could answer such questions
as: "What is the claim profile that results in the highest indemnity
payments due to the failure to disclose a known medical mistake?" and
"What are the associated clinical or systems issues that are predictive of
medical mistake or iatrogenic injury?" This type of research modeling
could provide a rich foundation for future research given the new
knowledge discovery. It is hoped this study will promote more refined
theory and new research designs. Research modeling is helical in nature
and incremental in complexity.
24 Jack Noonan, Data Mining Strategies, Data Mining Review 1 (July 2000), available at
http://www.dmreview.com/master.cfm?NavID=55&EdID=2367.
